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Abstract
This paper examines the interplay of informational and payoff externalities in a
two-player irreversible investment game. Each player learns about the quality of his
project by observing a private signal and the action of his opponent. I characterize the
unique symmetric equilibrium in a timing game that features a second-mover advantage,
allowing for arbitrary correlation in project qualities. Despite private learning, the game
reduces to a stochastic war of attrition. In contrast to the case of purely informational
externalities, all investments happen at the same real time instant—irrespective of the
sign of the correlation—and beliefs never get trapped in a no-learning region, provided
that the second-mover advantage is sufficiently high.
Keywords: irreversible investment, payoff externalities, war of attrition, real option.
JEL Codes: D83, D82
1 Introduction
Initial delay in adoption is a commonly observed empirical regularity in the diffusion of a
new technology (see Hoppe, 2002). The theoretical literature on innovation dynamics has
typically proposed two alternative explanations of this stylized fact: informational spillovers
and externalities in the innovation diffusion process. Recently, the strategic experimentation
literature has focused on the role of informational spillovers in dynamic environments in
which information accumulates over time: the interaction between private and observational
learning generates strategic incentives to delay risky ventures and wait for new information.
The objective of this paper is to study the optimal timing of the adoption of a new tech-
nology and to analyze the interplay between informational and payoff externalities in the
form of a second-mover advantage. As in the social learning literature, informational exter-
nalities are generated by the possibility of gathering private information prior to investing.
∗I am indebted to Johannes Hörner and Larry Samuelson for their invaluable help and encouragement
throughout this project. The paper benefited from comments by Martin Cripps, Juuso Välimäki, Nicolas
Vieille, and participants at the Micro Theory Lunch Seminar at Yale University. I thank an associate editor
and three referees for helpful comments, and Beixi Zhou for research assistance.
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authors study a duopoly model of investment in which players learn about the quality of a
common value project by observing some public information. In their model, information
is asymmetric because each player’s investment cost is privately known, while informational
externalities arise because the leader’s payoffs are observable. As a consequence, private
information is gradually revealed as players learn about the investment opportunity, and
the increase in signal quality enjoyed by the follower endogenously creates a second-mover
advantage.
Recently, other papers have studied the interaction between private learning and irre-
versible decisions in bandit games that feature payoff and informational externalities. In
Akcigit and Liu (2016), two players compete to be the first to achieve a breakthrough on a
safe and a risky research line; the paper studies the inefficiencies arising when breakthroughs
are observable, while breakdowns (dead ends) and research activities are not. Payoff exter-
nalities are positive in the collaboration model of Guo and Roesler (2018) in that players
share the proceeds from a breakthrough. Over time, players choose the level at which to
exert effort and have the option to abandon experimentation irreversibly and take an out-
side option. The paper studies effort dynamics when breakthroughs and exit decisions are
observable, and (costless) breakdowns and effort are not.
At a broader level, the paper is related to the early literature on herding and observational
learning, which assumes that players receive private information about a common state
variable at the beginning of the game. As in Chamley and Gale (1994), informational
externalities generate strategic delay in investment.
2 The Model
Time is continuous. Each of two players i ∈ {1, 2} chooses when, if ever, to irreversibly
invest in a risky project. Each player’s project can be either good (G) or bad (B). I denote
with (ω1, ω2) ∈ {G,B} × {G,B} the project-type profile. Players share a symmetric prior
distribution over type profiles that attaches probability p0 ∈ (0, 1) to each of the events
{ωi = G} for i = 1, 2. The prior distribution attaches probability p0 (p0 + (1− p0)ρ) to the
event {ω1 = G,ω2 = G} and probability (1− p0) (1− p0 + p0ρ) to the event {ω1 = B,ω2 =
B}, with ρ ∈ (max{−p0/(1− p0),−(1− p0)/p0}, 0)∪ (0, 1].1 (Equivalently, ρ is the Pearson
correlation coefficient for the random variables 1{ωi=G}, i = 1, 2.)
Over time, each player receives private signals about the quality of his project. If his
project is bad, a player’s private signals arrive according to a Poisson process with intensity
λ > 0. Signal processes are conditionally independent across players and independent of
investment decisions. A player never receives any signal if his project is good. Hence, any
1That is, the joint distribution over type profiles is
G B( )
G p0 (p0 + (1− p0)ρ) p0(1− p0)(1− ρ)
B p0(1− p0)(1− ρ) (1− p0) (1− p0 + p0 ρ) .
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signal provides conclusive evidence that the project is bad. I denote with τi ∈ [0,+∞] the
time at which player i observes his first signal.
The game consists of two stages. In the first stage, each player i chooses an investment
time ti(∅) ∈ [0,+∞], with the interpretation that player i invests at ti(∅) if τi ≥ ti(∅),
provided that the first stage does not end before ti(∅). The first stage ends as soon as one
player invests, that is, it ends at θ := infi{ti(∅) + 1{τi<ti(∅)}∞}. Define the set of first
movers I∗ := {i : ti(∅) = θ and ti(∅) <∞}.
If exactly one player invests as a first mover, at θ < ∞, the game transitions to the
second stage. In the second stage, the second mover i /∈ I∗ chooses an investment time
ti(θ) ∈ [θ,∞], with the interpretation that player i invests at ti(θ) if τi ≥ ti(θ).
Players discount their payoffs at a common discount rate r > 0. A terminal history
specifies the time of the first investment, θ ∈ [0,∞], the set of first movers I∗ ⊆ {1, 2}, and
the investment time of the second mover, provided that θ < ∞ and I∗ 6= {1, 2}. Given a
terminal history, the payoff to player i ∈ I∗ is
e−rθ
(
L(ωi)1{|I∗|=1} +M(ωi)1{|I∗|>1}
)
.
The payoff to player i /∈ I∗ is e−rtiF (ωi), where ti ∈ [θ,∞) is the time at which he invests,
and is equal to zero if i never invests.
I assume that there is a second-mover advantage, that is,
L(ωi) ≤M(ωi) ≤ F (ωi), ωi = B,G,
with the last inequality being strict for ωi = G. Further, investing is always profitable if
ωi = G, that is, L(G) > 0, and it is unprofitable whenever ωi = B, that is, F (B) < 0. The
investment cost is normalized to zero.2 Section 5 extends the model to allow for richer payoff
interdependences, showing that the qualitative results continue to hold. The discussion of
the case of a first-mover advantage is also postponed to Section 5.
A pure strategy is a function
ti : {∅} ∪ [0,∞]→ [0,∞],
such that ti(t) ≥ t whenever t 6= ∅. A (behavior) strategy maps each t ∈ {∅} ∪ [0,∞] to a
probability distribution over [0,∞] with support contained in [t,∞] whenever t 6= ∅. I state
the results in terms of (symmetric) perfect Bayesian equilibria.
It is worth noting that in this game, any Nash equilibrium is outcome-equivalent to a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In fact, because every history in which there is no investment
is on the equilibrium path, the only observable deviations are those in which a player invests
2Assuming that L(G)− L(B) = F (G)− F (B), the game is equivalent to the following strategic bandit
game. Each player faces two arms, a safe arm and a risky arm, and decides when to irreversibly switch from
the risky to the safe arm. A bad risky arm never yields any payoff. A good risky arm yields no payoff until a
random time, after which it yields a constant payoff flow with present value (λ+ r) (L(G)− L(B)) /λ. The
random time follows an exponential distribution with parameter λ. The safe arm yields a constant payoff
flow with present value L(G) to the player who first stops experimenting and a payoff flow with present
value F (G) to the one who stops second.
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when he is supposed to wait. However, by definition, a player’s expected payoff from such a
deviation does not depend on the opponent’s continuation play: a player’s terminal payoff
is determined at the time of his investment, and once he invests, he becomes inactive. As
a result, the equilibrium play remains optimal irrespective of the specification of players’
beliefs and continuation strategies after such off-path histories. For convenience, I shall omit
the specification of players’ beliefs and behavior after off-path histories from the description
of the equilibrium.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
3.1 Beliefs
Over time, each player forms beliefs about the profitability of his project. In the first
stage, two forces drive the evolution of a player’s beliefs: private learning and observational
learning.
Fix a first-stage strategy σj(∅) for player j, where σj(∅) is a probability distribution
over [0,∞]. It is convenient to represent such a strategy using the distribution function
Gj : [0,∞]→ [0, 1], defined as Gj(t) := σj(∅)([0, t]). Let pi(t) be player i’s belief about his
own project if he has not observed any signal, and player j has not invested by time t, i.e.,
pi(t) := Pr[ωi = G | θ ≥ t, τi ≥ t] .
The map pi : [0,∞)→ [0, 1] is left-continuous and admits a right limit. The discontinu-
ities of pi(t) coincide with the atoms of the distribution σj(∅). By Bayes’ rule, whenever
differentiable, pi(t) ∈ (0, 1) solves
p′i(t)
pi(t) (1− pi(t)) = λ
− (Pr [τj > t | ωi = G, θ ≥ t]− Pr [τj > t | ωi = B, θ ≥ t])
G′j(t)
1−Gj(t) .
(1)
The differential equation elucidates the two forms of learning: private and observational
learning. First, as time passes, player i grows optimistic since he has not observed any
signal: this is captured by the term λ on the right-hand side of (1). Second, the longer
player j waits, the more likely it is that he has observed a signal, and hence, his project is
bad, which brings either good or bad news, depending on the sign of ρ. It can be shown
that the term in parentheses in (1) has the same sign as ρ: plainly, when the projects are
positively (negatively) correlated, for any given history, the opponent is more likely to be
uninformed if a player’s own project is good (bad).
To put it differently, over time, each player forms beliefs about the quality of his own
project, about whether the opponent has observed a signal, and about the quality of oppo-
nent’s project. In the special case of perfect positive correlation, ρ = 1, equation (1) reduces
5
to
p′i(t)
pi(t) (1− pi(t)) = λ−
(
1− Pr [τj > t | θ ≥ t, τi ≥ t]
1− pi(t)
)
G′j(t)
1−Gj(t) .
When the correlation is perfect, at any point in time from the point of view of player i,
the payoff-relevant uncertainty is summarized by his belief about the common quality of the
projects and his belief about the information held by player j.
3.2 Single-Agent Problem
I start with the problem of a single player who observes only his own signal, which is
a natural benchmark and corresponds to the problem faced by a second mover. In this
section, I describe the optimal investment policy in the single-agent problem in which the
net present value payoff from investing as a function of the quality of the project is F (ω).
Throughout the section, I shall omit the player’s subscript.
Fix an initial belief, and denote by pi(t) ∈ [0, 1) the belief held by the player at time t if
he has not received any signal, that is, pi(t) := Pr[ω = G | τ ≥ t], where τ denotes the time
of his first signal. By Bayes’ rule, the posterior belief evolves according to
pi′(t) = −λpi(t) (1− pi(t)) .
By the principle of optimality, the value function satisfies, to the first order:
w(pi) = max
{
piF (G) + (1− pi)F (B), e−r dtE [w(pi + dpi) | pi]
}
, (2)
where the first term of the maximum is the expected payoff from investing and the second
term is expected payoff from waiting.
When waiting is optimal, so that the maximum in (2) is achieved by the second term,
the value function satisfies the differential equation
w(pi)(r + (1− pi)λ) = w′(pi)((1− pi)piλ) ,
with solution w(pi) = (pi/(1− pi))r/λ piK, where K ∈ R is a constant to be determined.
Following Keller et al. (2005) (see also Décamps and Mariotti, 2004), I apply value-matching
and smooth-pasting to obtain the following lemma, whose proof is omitted. Optimality
follows by standard verification arguments, as in Proposition 3.1 of Keller et al. (2005).
Lemma 1. In the single-agent problem, there is a cutoff belief p∗ given by
p∗ =
−(r + λ)F (B)
rF (G)− (r + λ)F (B) ,
such that below the cutoff, it is optimal for the player to wait, and above it, it is optimal to
invest. As a function of the belief pi, the value function is given by
W (pi) =
(
pi
1− pi
1− p∗
p∗
)r/λ pi
p∗
(p∗F (G) + (1− p∗)F (B)) ,
when pi < p∗, and W (pi) = piF (G) + (1− pi)F (B) otherwise.
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Let p∗ be the optimal cutoff belief in the single-agent problem in which the net present
value payoff from investing is L(ω),
p∗ :=
−(r + λ)L(B)
rL(G)− (r + λ)L(B) ,
and define t∗ := min{t ≥ 0 : pi(t) ≥ p∗}.
3.3 Symmetric Equilibrium
In any equilibrium, the second mover behaves according to the optimal single-player pol-
icy described in Lemma 1. At θ, he updates his belief about the profitability of his
project, taking correlation into account. The probability that the second mover i at-
taches to {ωi = G} at θ after he has seen the other player investing is either 0 or
φ(θ) := Pr [ωi = G | τi ≥ θ, τj ≥ θ], depending on whether τi < θ or τi ≥ θ.3 In the first
case, the second mover finds it optimal never to invest. In the second case, the expected
continuation payoff equalsW (φ(θ)), whereW : [0, 1]→ R is defined in Lemma 1; the second
mover invests as soon as his posterior belief about the quality of his project coincides with
the single-player cutoff p∗, or immediately, if φ(θ) ≥ p∗.
In the following, I describe equilibria by specifying only the profile of strategies adopted
by players in the first stage. That is, I say that (σ1, σ2) is an equilibrium if the profile of
strategies according to which σi(∅) = σi and players behave in the second stage as explained
in the previous paragraph is an equilibrium.
The next result characterizes the unique symmetric equilibrium of the game. With a
slight abuse of notation, define the first-mover payoff function as L(p) := pL(G)+(1−p)L(B).
Theorem 1. There is a unique symmetric equilibrium, which is nonatomic. The cdf of the
equilibrium strategy G : [0,∞)→ [0, 1] is
G(t) =

0 t ≤ t∗,
Gˆ(t) t ∈ (t∗, t),
1 t ≥ t,
where Gˆ(t) is the unique solution of the following integro-differential equation4 on [t∗,∞)
such that Gˆ(t∗) = 0
(φ(t)− p∗) (1− Gˆ(t)) + (1− φ(t)) eλt
(
1− e−λt∗ + λ
∫ t
t∗
e−λs(1− Gˆ(s)) ds
)
· (Pr[ωi = G | ωj = B, τi ≥ t]− p∗) = p∗
(
W (φ(t))− L (φ(t))
−(λ+ r)L(B)
)
Gˆ′(t),
(3)
3More precisely, beliefs are updated according to Bayes’ rule on path, i.e., whenever θ is in the support
of the equilibrium strategy. As discussed, the specification of off-the-equilibrium path beliefs and behavior
is inconsequential as far as the equilibrium is concerned and is hence omitted.
4Note that Pr[ωi = G | ωj = B, τi ≥ t] = (p0(1− ρ)) /
(
p0(1− ρ) + (1− p0(1− ρ)) e−λt
)
and hence is a
function only of time.
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and t := inf{t : Gˆ(t) = 1}.
Equation (3) characterizes each player’s investment behavior conditional on him not
having observed any signal and the game being in the first stage. By the equilibrium
condition, at any time t in the support of the equilibrium distribution, t ∈ [t∗, t), player i is
indifferent between investing at t and waiting an additional arbitrarily short amount of time
before investing. Let θj be the (random) time at which player j invests. The indifference
condition of player i at time t can be written as
lim
ε→0
Pr[θj < t+ ε | θj ≥ t, τi ≥ t]
ε
=
rL(pi(t)) + λ(1− pi(t))L(B)
W (φ(t))− L(φ(t)) . (4)
(Recall that by assumption, W (φ(t))− L (φ(t)) > 0 for any φ(t) ∈ (0, 1].)
The left-hand side is the probability that player i attaches to player j investing in the
interval [t, t + ε). Assuming that player j invests according to the (absolutely continuous)
distribution function G, the “expected” investment rate in (4) is related to the distribution
function by
lim
ε→0
Pr[θj < t+ ε | θj ≥ t, τi ≥ t]
ε
= Pr [τj ≥ t | θj ≥ t, τi ≥ t]
G′(t)
1−G(t).
Equation (4) makes it clear that the game reduces to a stochastic war of attrition: the
expected investment rate that makes player i indifferent between waiting and investing (the
left-hand side) equals the ratio between the rate at which the expected first-mover payoff
decreases and the second-mover advantage (the right-hand side).
However, in contrast to a stochastic war of attrition in which information is public,
players’ actions reveal their private information. As a result, while the belief pi(t) appears in
the expected first-mover payoff (the numerator in (4)), the expected second-mover advantage
(the denominator in (4)) is a function of φ(t), the belief conditional on none of the players
having observed any signal.
The upshot of Theorem 1 is that the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilib-
rium proven by Rosenberg et al. (2013) is robust to the introduction of payoff externalities.
Although the equilibrium characterization in terms of a stochastic war of attrition is specific
to my model because it relies on positive payoff externalities, there is no discontinuity either
in the equilibrium (first-stage) strategy or in the belief path.
Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium distribution (left panel) and the belief trajectory
(right panel) for different levels of correlation.5 It also provides an illustration of a general
equilibrium feature. The support of the equilibrium strategy is bounded or unbounded
depending on whether the projects’ qualities are perfectly correlated.
Lemma 2. t =∞ if and only if ρ = 1.
5In the case of positive correlation, the belief trajectory need not be monotone. In fact, the equilibrium is
not Markovian in this variable because a player’s belief about his own project does not suffice to summarize
his assessment of the different sources of uncertainty.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium distribution G(t) (left) and belief trajectory pi(t) (right) for
(p0, λ, r, L(G), L(B), F (G), F (B)) = (1/4, 6/5, 1/2, 9,−2, 10,−1)
The intuition behind the lemma is as follows. With imperfect correlation, the longer
the delay of player j is, the higher the probability that player i (if uninformed) attaches to
the event {ωi = G,ωj = B}; the probability that player i attaches to {τj < t} converges
to 1 as t approaches t.6 A player who is sufficiently confident that the opponent will never
invest has no reason to abstain from investing unless he has observed a signal himself, and
hence, the support of the equilibrium strategy is bounded. In contrast, in the case of perfect
correlation, the probability that player i attaches to {τj < t} is bounded above by 1 − p∗.
In fact, as shown in the Appendix, irrespective of the correlation, whenever a player finds
it optimal to invest, the probability he attaches to his project being bad is no larger than
1 − p∗. Player j observes a signal only if his project is bad, and with perfect correlation,
player j’s project is bad only if player i’s project is bad, hence the bound.
Similar to Rosenberg et al. (2013), the symmetric equilibrium is the unique perfect
Bayesian equilibrium if the correlation is negative,7 while there exist asymmetric equilibria
in which the equilibrium strategy involves atoms if the projects are positively correlated.
In particular, when ρ > 0, there are two pure strategy equilibria, (t∗, t˜) and (t˜, t∗), where
t˜ := min{t ≥ 0 : Pr [ωi = G | ωj = B, τi ≥ t] ≥ p∗}.8
6This observation also implies that the hazard rate at the upper end of the support must diverge to
infinity: a player who attaches arbitrarily high probability to the opponent having observed a signal, can be
made indifferent only if the rate at which an uninformed player invests is made arbitrarily high. It can be
shown that the hazard rate diverges to infinity only if limt→tG
′(t) 6= 0, which explains the kinks in the left
panel of Figure 1.
7Equilibrium uniqueness in the case of negative correlation follows from Rosenberg et al. (2013); since
only minor modifications of their arguments are needed, I omit a formal proof.
8As in Rosenberg et al. (2013), more complex asymmetric equilibria may exist.
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4 The Role of Payoff Externalities
The magnitude of the second-mover advantage does not affect welfare in the symmetric
equilibrium. Each player’s ex-ante expected payoff is equal to the value of the single-agent
problem with payoff function L. While payoff externalities do not affect welfare, they affect
the equilibrium outcome, namely, the distribution of investment times conditional on type
profiles, and the learning dynamics.
An increase in the second-mover advantage raises the continuation payoff after the first
investment. As equilibrium payoffs do not change, a higher expected payoff in the second
stage must be offset by an increase in the investment delay. The following proposition
formalizes this intuition. For the purpose of this section, it is convenient to assume F (G) =
L(G) + ∆ and F (B) = L(B) + ∆; thus, ∆ > 0 measures the magnitude of the second-mover
advantage.
Proposition 1. Fix L(B) and L(G), and let F (ω) = L(ω)+∆. The equilibrium distribution
functions are ranked by first-order stochastic dominance: G(t) decreases in ∆, for all t ≥ 0.9
The result is intuitive but not obvious. In light of the comparative statics in war of
attrition games, it is natural to expect that the delay should increase with ∆. However, a
player who expects the opponent to wait longer before investing attaches lower probability
to the opponent being informed should he not invest. As a result, when the projects are
positively correlated, a decrease in the opponent’s distribution (in the sense of first-order
stochastic dominance) makes a player more optimistic about the quality of his own project,
thereby increasing the cost of delaying investment.
In the proof of Proposition 1, I first show that the equilibrium belief paths for different
levels of ∆ are ordered pointwise. A larger ∆ increases or decreases the belief trajectory
depending on whether projects are positively or negatively correlated. Next, I show that the
ranking of beliefs implies the ranking of investment distributions. Intuitively, if projects are
positively correlated, at a given time, a player can hold a higher belief only if the probability
he attached to an uninformed opponent investing before that time is lower. The opposite is
true if projects are negatively correlated.
Figure 2 provides an illustration. Proposition 1 has implications in terms of equilibrium
outcome and learning dynamics. I explore these implications in the following sections.
4.1 Equilibrium Outcome
Private information accumulates over time. The longer a player delays his investment, the
lower the chances of investing in a bad project acting as a first mover and the stronger the
informational content generated by the investment of the opponent, should the latter be the
first mover. As a result, the magnitude of the second-mover advantage affects the overall
probability of investing in a bad project.
9Letting F (ω) = L(ω) + ∆ω, it is straightforward to adapt the proof of Proposition 1 and show that
G(t) decreases in ∆ω for all ω.
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However, returns to adoption are determined not only by the uncertain profitability of the
new technology but also by the presence of other adopters, giving rise to payoff externali-
ties. A second-mover advantage arises when a follower can free-ride on the leader’s effort
to jump-start the new technology or benefit from better positioning, lower adoption costs,
and network externalities. For example, in pharmaceutical markets, later movers can free-
ride on pioneers’ endeavors to increase consumers’ perception of the safety and efficacy of a
therapeutic class of drugs (see Azoulay et al., 2003). A second-mover advantage also arises
when firms make decisions concerning entry into a market with horizontally differentiated
products (see Frisell, 2003).
I study the interaction between payoff and informational externalities in a two-player
timing game. Each player has the option of undertaking an irreversible investment (e.g.,
adopting a new technology). Players’ investment opportunities are arbitrarily correlated,
and each player prefers to be a follower rather than a leader. Over time, each player observes
private signals that bring conclusive news about the low quality of his own project, which
makes it unprofitable to invest.
First, I show that in the unique symmetric equilibrium, the presence of a second-mover
advantage increases investment delay relative to the case with no payoff externalities: play-
ers’ incentive to wait is now twofold. Waiting increases the probability of benefiting from
observational learning and from the second-mover advantage. The structure of the equi-
librium is intuitive: the game reduces to a war of attrition with incomplete information
in which the payoffs of the leader and follower are specified to capture both payoff and
informational externalities.
Then, I investigate how payoff externalities affect the equilibrium outcome and the learn-
ing dynamics as compared to the case of purely informational externalities. I derive two
predictions in terms of observable variables. First, the probability of investing in an unprof-
itable project is decreasing in the magnitude of payoff externalities. Second, when projects
are negatively correlated, in equilibrium all investments occur at the same real time instant
only if there is a second-mover advantage.
Related Literature
My model combines a timing game of new technology adoption (e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole,
1985 or Reinganum, 1981) under uncertainty and an exponential two-armed bandit problem,
as studied by Keller, Rady, and Cripps (2005).
Within the strategic experimentation literature, the paper is closely related to Rosenberg,
Salomon, and Vieille (2013) and Murto and Välimäki (2011). These two papers analyze in
continuous and in discrete time, respectively, a symmetric two-armed bandit game in which
the risky arms are correlated and experimentation outcomes are private, whereas the decision
to switch from the risky arm to the safe one is observable and irreversible. Such a game is
equivalent to the irreversible investment game I study. However, their analysis is conducted
in a setting of purely informational externalities.
The idea of second-mover advantage in an investment game has been explored in Dé-
camps and Mariotti (2004) (see also Kwon, Xu, Agrawal, and Muthulingam, 2016). These
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Figure 2: Equilibrium distribution G(t) (left) and belief trajectory (right) for
(p0, λ, r, L(G), L(B), F (G), F (B)) = (1/3, 3/2, 1/2, 8,−6, 8 + ∆,−6 + ∆)
Proposition 2. In equilibrium, the total probability that player i invests in a bad project,
Pr[θi <∞ | ωi = B], is decreasing in ∆.
While the proposition is valid irrespective of the sign of ρ, a player who acts as a second
mover behaves differently depending on the sign of the correlation. When the correlation
is positive, an investment by one player brings good news to the other player, and the
equilibrium always exhibits a follow-the-leader behavior. That is, in equilibrium, if only one
player invests as a first mover, the opponent follows suit with no delay, i.e., ti(t) = t for all
t ≥ t∗.
When the correlation is negative, whether a second mover finds it optimal to wait for a
while before investing depends on φ(θ) ≶ p∗. Because φ(t) is increasing in t, a second mover
acts with no delay only if the first investment occurs sufficiently late in the game. The
next proposition states that when the correlation is negative, in equilibrium all investments
happen at the same real time instant only if the second-mover advantage is sufficiently high.
Proposition 3. For any feasible vector of parameters (p0, ρ, λ, L(G), L(B)), there exists
κ ∈ (0,−L(B)) such that whenever F (ω) > L(ω) + κ for ω = G,B, in equilibrium the
second mover invests at time θ with positive probability.
The result stands in contrast to the case of purely informational externalities: as shown
by Rosenberg et al. (2013), if the correlation is negative, the second mover always waits
before investing because φ(t) < p∗. In the absence of payoff externalities, the investment of
a player always brings useful information to the other player, who then revises his course of
action. With payoff externalities, if the first investment occurs sufficiently late in the game,
an uninformed second mover follows suit: the information revealed by the first investment
cannot overturn the evidence accumulated up to that time.
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4.2 Learning Dynamics
An implication of Proposition 1 is that the magnitude of the second-mover advantage affects
the speed of observational learning. The larger the second-mover advantage is, the weaker
the inference drawn by the lack of investment.
When ρ > 0, observational learning and private learning provide confounding evidence.
Along a player’s history with no signal, the bad news from the delay of the opponent dampens
the good news from the lack of private signals. Rosenberg et al. (2013) and Murto and
Välimäki (2011) observe that this phenomenon has extreme consequences in the absence
of payoff externalities: for any level of positive correlation, the player’s equilibrium belief
in the first stage of the game is constant. Intuitively, since there is no marginal benefit
from waiting for the other to invest, each player’s posterior at any time in the support of
the equilibrium distribution must be equal to the cutoff belief that makes the single agent
indifferent between waiting and investing.
The situation is different when there are payoff externalities. In this case, there is always
a marginal benefit from waiting for the other to invest and the belief is never constant. Yet,
for some parameters, confounded learning may still arise asymptotically.
In the special case of perfectly positively correlated types, the relationship between payoff
externalities and confounded learning can be made precise. When ρ = 1, the support of the
equilibrium distribution is unbounded; in other words, each player attaches positive proba-
bility to reaching any first-stage history of arbitrary length. Consequently, the asymptotic
belief limt→∞ pi(t) provides a natural gauge.
The next result establishes when confounded learning arises asymptotically. Define
v := rL(G)/ (F (G)− L(G)); namely, v is the investment rate in the unique symmetric equi-
librium of the war of attrition in which both projects are known to be good (see Hendricks
et al., 1988).
Proposition 4. Assume ρ = 1. In the unique symmetric equilibrium,
lim
t→∞ pi(t) =

1 if v < λ,
− L(B) (λ+ r)
(r + λ) (L(G)− L(B))− λF (G) if v ≥ λ.
The belief converges to 1 if and only if the “attrition motive”, as captured by v, is suffi-
ciently strong. When the second-mover advantage is small, the interaction of observational
and private learning slows the inference process: eventually, the history becomes uninfor-
mative about the state, and the posterior belief converges to some interior level.
The condition v ≷ λ is easy to understand. If beliefs are to converge to 1, the good
news from the absence of private signals must eventually dominate the bad news from no
investment, so that the equilibrium belief increases over time. As players become arbitrarily
optimistic, the indifference condition prescribes investment at a rate arbitrarily close to
(but strictly lower than) the complete information concession rate v. If v ≥ λ, namely, the
expected investment rate is larger than the rate at which signals arrive, no news is bad news;
thus, the belief decreases. Hence, beliefs converge to one only if v < λ.
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On the other hand, if players’ beliefs are to converge to some interior value, the two infor-
mative events must arrive at the same rate. This implies that heuristically, the investment
rate must converge to λ so that, in the limit, the belief is constant.
To be clear, the belief pi(t) is the player’s posterior along a history that occurs with
vanishing probability as t → ∞. Even when the asymptotic belief converges to an interior
value, an outside observer who does not have access to players’ private signals becomes
increasingly pessimistic about the state of the world.
Nevertheless, Proposition 4 sheds light on the main forces at play in the symmetric
equilibrium. In short, the history can be informative of the underlying state only if waiting
to be the second mover brings useful information and/or payoff benefits. If both of these
advantages are absent, an impatient player can be made indifferent between waiting and
investing only if time (i.e., a lack of signals and investments) does not bring information
either.
5 Extensions
In this section, I discuss the key assumptions of the model and the extent to which they can
be relaxed.
5.1 Richer Payoff Interdependence
Assuming that the leader’s payoff from investing does not depend on the behavior of the
follower avoids the need of discussing refinements. In this section, I argue that this convenient
assumption is not critical to the main findings.
In the spirit of Gale (1995), assume that if player i = 1, 2 is the first to invest at θ, i.e.,
I∗ = {i}, and player j invests at tj > θ, then the realized payoff of player i is
r
(∫ tj
θ
e−rtL(ωi) dt+
∫ ∞
tj
e−rtF (ωi) dt
)
.
That is, the flow payoff from investing is increasing in the number of investors: the first
mover bears a loss in payoff of ∆ω := F (ω) − L(ω) until the follower joins. The setup is
otherwise unchanged.
I focus on the case of positive correlation, ρ > 0 and p0/(1− p0) < −F (B)/F (G). Last,
I assume that
(r + λ)
(
L(B) + p0(1− ρ)
(
∆G + ∆B
))
+ 2(r + 2λ)(1− p0 + p0ρ)∆B ≤ 0.
(The role of these assumptions is discussed in the Appendix.)
I study (symmetric) perfect Bayesian equilibria satisfying a refinement in the same spirit
of those proposed by Cho and Kreps (1987) and Banks and Sobel (1987). Recall that not
investing is a dominant action for a player who has observed a signal and that the only
observable deviations are those in which a player invests when he is supposed to wait. I
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require that the off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs after such a deviation attach probability
zero to the deviating player having observed a signal prior to investing.10
Theorem 2. There is a unique symmetric equilibrium, which is nonatomic. The cdf of the
equilibrium strategy G : [0,∞)→ [0, 1] is
G(t) =

0 t ≤ t†,
G˘(t) t ∈ (t†, t),
1 t ≥ t,
where t† < t∗, G˘(t) is the unique solution of the integro-differential equation (13) such that
G˘(t†) = 0, and t := inf{t : G˘(t) = 1}. (The definition of t† and the integro-differential
equation (13) are relegated to the Appendix.)
Not surprisingly, in equilibrium, players find it optimal to invest earlier, as compared to
the baseline model, i.e., t† < t∗. In fact, the expected payoff from investing as a leader is
now higher because in equilibrium, if the follower is uninformed, he follows suit, and the
leader does not bear any miscoordination costs.
Proposition 1 generalizes to this setup as well: the larger the miscoordination cost is,
the longer the delay. (See Figure 3)
Proposition 5. Fix F (B) and F (G), and let L(ω) = F (ω)−∆. The equilibrium distribution
functions are ranked by first-order stochastic dominance: G(t) decreases in ∆, for all t ≥ 0.
5.2 Second-mover Advantage
While there is an extensive literature on the advantage of being the first to adopt a new
technology, a number of empirical studies suggest that second movers can sometimes have
an advantage.11 A complete analysis of the case of a first-mover advantage is of interest
but beyond the scope of this paper. Here, I describe the challenges that arise in extending
the analysis to that case and summarize the similarities and differences with the case of a
second-mover advantage.
In the case of a first-mover advantage too, the irreversibility of actions allows for the
incomplete information game to be reduced to a stochastic timing game of complete in-
formation by appropriately defining a player’s payoffs in cases where he is the first mover,
where he is the second mover, and where there is simultaneous investment.
10To see that other equilibria exist, assume that ρ = 1. Note that if a player expects the opponent not
to follow suit, then he will not find it optimal to invest earlier than t∗. One can construct a symmetric
equilibrium in which no investment occurs earlier than t∗ by assuming that following a deviation to early
investment, the remaining player attaches probability 1 to the deviating player having observed a bad signal.
11Tellis and Golder (1996) show that, on average, second entrants have greater long-term success and
higher market shares; in their analysis of two pharmaceutical markets, Shankar et al. (1998) find that second
movers enjoy higher profits, and Boulding and Christen (2003) find that pioneers incur larger and persistent
cost disadvantages.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium distribution G(t) (left) and belief trajectory pi(t) (right) for
(p0, ρ, λ, r, L(G), L(B), F (G), F (B)) = (1/3, 2/5, 1/4, 1/2, 6−∆,−8−∆, 6,−8).
One can show that when ρ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a symmetric equilibrium in nonatomic
strategies. The equilibrium distribution solves the differential equation (3), but in contrast
to the case of a second-mover advantage, investment may occur earlier than in the case of a
single agent, and players’ beliefs in the first stage are bounded above by p∗. The equilibrium
distribution and the belief trajectory in such an equilibrium are shown in Figure 4.
If ρ = 1 and M(G) < L(G), such an equilibrium does not exist. I suspect that in this
case, the existence of a symmetric equilibrium can be guaranteed only by extending the
definition of strategies as in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) (see also Riedel and Steg, 2017) to
endow players with an endogenous coordination device.12 With this extension, there exists
an equilibrium in which the first investment occurs at the “boundary” of the preemption
region, i.e., as soon as a player is indifferent between being the first or the second mover,
and each player becomes a first mover with probability 1/2.13
12Adopting Riedel and Steg (2017)’s approach in this setup raises some concerns regarding the inter-
pretation. As in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), the extension aims to represent the limit of a sequence
of strategies for discrete-time games with vanishing length of period. Applying the strategy extension to
the incomplete information timing game with payoffs e−rθL (ωi)1{i∈I∗,|I∗|=1} + e−rθM (ωi)1{i∈I∗,|I∗|=2} +
e−rθW (φ(θ))1{i/∈I∗} neglects the fact that in the discrete-time game of incomplete information, players
update their belief between periods. To circumvent these issues, one could take the alternative route of
imposing a simple tie-breaking rule that specifies the probability with which each player becomes a second
mover in the case of simultaneous investment.
13Incidentally, this equilibrium parallels the unique symmetric equilibrium of the bandit game analyzed
by Thomas (2018) in the special case in which switching from the risky arm to the safe one is irreversible (see
Thomas, 2018, Sec. 4). In fact, Thomas’s game is equivalent to a winner-takes-all irreversible investment
game.
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Figure 4: Equilibrium distribution G(t) (left) and belief trajectory pi(t)
(right) in the nonatomic equilibrium for (p0, ρ, λ, r, L(G), L(B), F (G), F (B)) =
(1/3, 1/2, 1, 1/2, 2,−2, 1,−3)
5.3 Tie-breaking Rule
The uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium relies on the tie-breaking assumption. If a
simultaneous investment yields the second-mover payoff to both players (i.e., M(ω) = F (ω)
for ω = G,B), the game admits additional symmetric equilibria in which the equilibrium
strategy has atoms. The set of symmetric equilibrium payoffs can be characterized by
focusing on the simple class of equilibria in which the strategy has at most one atom.
Further, the (unique) nonatomic equilibrium achieves the worst equilibrium payoff, while
the best equilibrium strikes a balance between delay (the time it takes for players to start
investing with positive probability) and coordination (the probability of a simultaneous
investment).
5.4 Learning from the Leader’s Experience
I assumed that no additional information is generated by the first investment: the only
information obtained by the second mover comes from observational learning. However,
the payoff structure makes it possible to capture situations in which an additional signal is
generated as soon as the first player invests. In the spirit of Décamps and Mariotti (2004) (see
also Hoppe, 2000), assume that at the time of the first investment, the second mover observes
a public good-news signal. Then, even in the absence of payoff externalities, the expected
second-mover payoff function would have the same properties as in the baseline case. Thus,
the framework of the paper can be used to study the interaction between observational
learning and learning externalities due to information generated by the leader’s investment.
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Appendix
A.1 Preliminaries
I denote with ui(t, σj) the expected payoff induced by the strategy profile (t, σj). Here, I
derive the explicit formula for ui(t, σj).
Let θj denote the investment time of player j. Player i’s expected payoff is
ui(t, σj) = Pr [θj > t, τi ≥ t] e−rtL(pi(t+)) + Pr [θj = t, τi ≥ t] e−rtM(φ(t))
+E
[
e−rθjW (φ(θj))1{θj<min{t,τi}}
]
,
where pi(t+) := Pr [ωi = G | θj > t, τi ≥ t]. For t0 < t,
ui(t, σj)− ui(t0, σj) =
Pr [θj > t, τi ≥ t] e−rtL(pi(t+))− Pr [θj > t0, τi ≥ t0] e−rt0L(pi(t0+))
+ Pr [θj = t, τi ≥ t] e−rtM(φ(t))− Pr [θj = t0, τi ≥ t0] e−rt0M(φ(t0))
+ E
[
e−rθjW (φ(θj))1{t0≤θj<min{t,τi}}
]
.
(5)
Notice that ui(t, σj) is continuous over any open interval (t, t) such that σj ({t}) = 0 for
any t ∈ (t, t).
Given a strategy of player j, σj , let Gj(t) := σj([0, t]) and define Hj(t) :=
∫ t
0 e
−λs(1 −
Gj(s)) ds.
A.2 Proofs for Section 3
The proof for Theorem 1 is relegated to the Online Appendix as it mostly follows from
adapting Rosenberg et al. (2013)’s arguments.
A.2.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Consider first the case ρ < 1. Assume for the sake of contradiction that t =∞. Let rewrite
(3) as
κ eλt
(
H ′′j (t) + λH
′
j(t)
)
= − e
λt (φ(t)− p∗)
W (φ(t))− L (φ(t))H
′
j(t)−
eλt (1− φ(t))α(t)
W (φ(t))− L (φ(t))λHj(t), (6)
with α(t) := Pr[ωi = G | ωj = B, τi ≥ t]− p∗, and κ > 0. Define
tψ := inf{t ∈ R+ : φ(t) ≥ p∗ and Pr[ωi = G | ωj = B, τi ≥ t] ≥ p∗}.
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It is easy to see that irrespective of ρ < 1, tψ <∞. Let tˆ > tψ. Then, integrating,
κeλtH ′(t) = κeλtˆH ′(tˆ)−
∫ t
tˆ
eλs (φ(s)− p∗)
W (φ(s))− L (φ(s))H
′(s) ds
− λ
∫ t
tˆ
eλs(1− φ(s))α(s)
W (φ(s))− L (φ(s))H(s) ds. (7)
Using the definition of φ(t),
lim
t→∞(1− φ(t))e
λt =
(1− p0)p0(1− ρ)
p0(p0 + (1− p0)ρ) > 0.
Recall that W (φ(t))− L (φ(t)) > 0 for any t ≥ t∗. It follows that the second integral in (7)
converges to −∞ and eλtH ′(t)→ −∞, which contradicts t =∞.
Now consider the case ρ = 1. The differential equation (6) simplifies to
(φ(t)− p∗)H ′(t)− λH(t) (1− φ(t)) p∗
= −p∗
(
W (φ(t))− L (φ(t))
−(λ+ r)L(B)
)(
H ′′(t) + λH ′(t)
)
.
(8)
Assume by contradiction that t < ∞. Hence, H ′(t) = 0 and H ′(t) > 0 for t < t. By (8)
H ′′(t) > 0 for some neighborhood of t, which contradicts H ′(t) crossing zero from above.
It is apparent from (6) that if ρ < 1, so that t <∞, e−λt
(
H ′′j (t) + λH
′
j(t)
)
6= 0, which
implies that the equilibrium distribution has a kink at t.
A.3 Proofs for Section 4
A.3.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof is organized in three steps. First, I derive a differential equation for the belief
pi(t) (rather than a differential system for pi(t) and G(t)). Second, I show that for different
correlation parameters, the belief paths are ordered pointwise. Third, I show that the
ranking of belief paths implies that of equilibrium distributions.
Differential equation for pi(t)
Let σj be a given non-atomic strategy of player j and let pi(t) be the belief of player i when
facing the strategy σj . As before, let Gj(t) := σj([0, t]).
Lemma 3. Let [t, t] ⊂ suppσj. The following two statements are equivalent:
(i) the map t 7→ ui(t, σj) is constant over [t, t];
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(ii) on the interval [t, t], the function pi(t) is of class C1 and is a solution to
p′i(t) = λ pi(t)(1− pi(t))− (φ(t)− pi(t))
rL(pi(t)) + λ(1− pi(t))L(B)
W (φ(t))− L (φ(t)) (9)
Proof. I show that (3) is equivalent to (9). After rearranging, (3) (see also (OA.2)) is
equivalent to
rL(pi(t)) + λ(1− pi(t))L(B)
W (φ(t))− L (φ(t)) = Pr [τj > t | θj ≥ t, τi ≥ t]
G′j(t)
1−Gj(t). (10)
Since conditional on ωi, τi is independent of θj and τj ,
Pr [τj ≥ t | ωi = G, θj ≥ t]
Pr [τj > t | θj ≥ t, τi ≥ t] =
φ(t)
pi(t)
, and
Pr [τj ≥ t | ωi = B, θj ≥ t]
Pr [τj > t | θj ≥ t, τi ≥ t] =
1− φ(t)
1− pi(t) .
Using these relationships and (10) to substitute for G′j(t)/ (1−Gj(t)) in (1) yields (9).
Ranking of the belief paths
Recall that F (ω) = L(ω) + ∆, ω = G,B. With this normalization, the function W can be
written as
W (p) =

(
p
1−p
1−p∗∆
p∗∆
)r/λ
p
p∗∆
(
p∗∆L(G) + (1− p∗∆)L(B) + ∆) if p ≤ p∗∆,
pL(G) + (1− p)L(B) + ∆ if p > p∗∆.
Lemma 4. If ρ ≥ 0 (ρ ≤ 0), the equilibrium belief path p∆i (t) increases (respectively de-
creases) in ∆ for all t ≥ 0.
Proof. In equilibrium, players invest with positive probability only after t∗, and t∗ does not
change with ∆; hence, it is sufficient to prove that the ranking holds for all t ≥ t∗.
Because φ(t) > pi(t) if and only if ρ > 0 and W (p) is increasing pointwise in ∆, the
right-hand side of (9) is increasing in ∆ if and only if ρ > 0. On [t∗, t], pi(t) is the unique
solution of the first-order differential equation (9) satisfying pi(t∗) = p∗, where again p∗
does not depend on ∆. The result then follows from a standard comparison argument (see
Teschl, 2012, Theorem 1.3).
Ranking of the equilibrium distribution
Let Γ : C1 (R+)→ C2 (R+) be the one-to-one map between belief paths pi(t) and distribu-
tion functions Gj(t). The map Γ : p 7→ G is implicitly defined by
p
1− p =
p0
(1− p0) e−λt
·
(p0 + (1− p0)ρ) (1−G(t)) + (1− p0)(1− ρ)
(
e−λt (1−G(t)) + λ ∫ t0 e−λs (1−G(s)) ds)
(1− p0 + p0ρ)
(
λ
∫ t
0 e
−λs (1−G(s)) ds+ e−λt (1−G(t))
)
+ p0(1− ρ) (1−G(t))
.
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Lemma 5. If ρ ≥ 0 (ρ ≤ 0), the map Γ : C1 (R+) → C2 (R+) is decreasing (increasing)
over the set of functions p ∈ C1 (R+) such that p(0) = p0.
Proof. As is clear from rewriting the definition of Γ as
p(t)
1− p(t) =
p0
(1− p0) e−λt
(p0 + (1− p0)ρ) eλt + (1− p0)(1− ρ)
(
1 +
λ
∫ t
0 e
−λs(1−G(s)) ds
e−λt(1−G(t))
)
(1− p0 + p0ρ)
(
λ
∫ t
0 e
−λs(1−G(s)) ds
e−λt(1−G(t)) + 1
)
+ p0(1− ρ)eλt
,
for p, q ∈ C1 (R+), if p(t) ≥ q(t) for all t ≥ 0 and ρ > 0, then∫ t
0 e
−λs (1− Γ(p)(s)) ds
e−λt (1− Γ(p)(t)) ≤
∫ t
0 e
−λs (1− Γ(q)(s)) ds
e−λt (1− Γ(q)(t)) ,
while the opposite inequality holds for ρ < 0.
I now show that for G†, G‡ ∈ C2 (R+), if G†(0) = G‡(0) = 0, and for all t ≥ 0∫ t
0 e
−λs (1−G†(s)) ds
1−G†(t) ≥
∫ t
0 e
−λs (1−G‡(s)) ds
1−G‡(t) ,
then G†(t) ≥ G‡(t) for all t ≥ 0.
Define t = inf{t : G†(t) < G‡(t)} and assume by contradiction that t is finite. First,
notice that
d
dt
(∫ t
0 e
−λs (1−G(s)) ds
1−G(t)
)
= e−λt +
∫ t
0 e
−λs (1−G(s)) ds
1−G(t)
G′(t)
1−G(t) .
Hence, dG
†(t)
dt
∣∣
t=0
≥ dG‡(t)dt
∣∣
t=0
and t > 0. Since G† and G‡ are continuous, G†(t) = G‡(t).
Therefore, ∫ t
0 e
−λs (1−G†(s)) ds
1−G†(t) <
∫ t
0 e
−λs (1−G‡(s)) ds
1−G‡(t) ,
which is a contradiction.
Proposition 1 follows from combining Lemma 4 and Lemma 5.
A.3.2 Proof of Proposition 2
I divide the proof into two cases, depending on the sign of the correlation. For each case,
given a symmetric strategy (σ, σ), I write the probability of investing in a bad project
Pr[θi < ∞ | ωi = B] in terms of the distribution function G : R+ 7→ [0, 1], G(t) := σ([0, t]).
I then show that Pr[θi <∞ | ωi = B] is decreasing in G.
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The result then follows from Proposition 1, which states that fixing all other parameters,
the equilibrium strategies are ranked by first-order stochastic dominance.
For any distribution G, let θˆGj be the (improper) random variable with distribution
function
t 7→ ((1− p0) + p0ρ)
(
1− e−λt (1−G(t))−
∫ t
0
λe−λs (1−G(s)) ds
)
+ (1− p0)(1− ρ)G(t),
and let θˆGi be the random variable with distribution function t 7→ G(t).
Assume that both players invest according to the distribution G. Conditional on {ωi =
B}, the time at which player i invests should he ignore player j’s action has the same
distribution as θˆGj .
Given two distribution functions G† : R+ → [0, 1] and G‡ : R+ → [0, 1] such that
G‡ first-order stochastically dominates G†, i.e., G‡(t) ≤ G†(t), for all t ≥ 0, the random
variable θˆG‡j first-order stochastically dominates θˆ
G†
j . It follows that the random variable
min{θˆG‡j , θˆG
‡
i } first-order stochastically dominates min{θˆG
†
j , θˆ
G†
i }, where for G = G†, G‡, θˆGj
and θˆGi are understood to be independent random variables.
Positive correlation Assume that G(t∗) = 0, so that on path as soon as the first mover
invests, the second mover follows suit. Hence,
Pr[θi <∞ | ωi = B] = Pr
[
τi ≥ θˆGj | θˆGj < θˆGi , ωi = B
]
+ Pr
[
τi ≥ θˆGi | θˆGj > θˆGi , ωi = B
]
= E
[
e−λmin{θˆ
G
j ,θˆ
G
i }
]
.
In words, conditional on {ωi = B}, player i invests at some finite time if one of the following
events occurs. Either player j invests as a first mover, and by the time he does so, player
i has not received any signal and follows suit. Alternatively, player i invests as a first
mover. The second equality is immediate since signals follow an exponential distribution.
Since t 7→ e−λt is decreasing, the map from the set of distribution functions endowed with
the first-order stochastic dominance order to the probability of investing in a bad project,
Pr[θi <∞ | ωi = B], is order-reversing.
Negative correlation Define w(t) = min{s ≥ 0 : φ(t)/ ((1− φ(t))e−λs) ≥ p∗}. If the
first mover invests at time t, the second mover optimally waits until time θ + w(θ) before
investing. Hence,
Pr[θi <∞ | ωi = B] = Pr
[
τi ≥ θˆGj + w(θˆGj ) | θˆGj < θˆGi , ωi = B
]
+ Pr
[
τi ≥ θˆGi | θˆGj > θˆGi , ωi = B
]
= E
[
e−λmin{θˆj+w(θˆ
G
j ),θˆi}
]
.
Since the first-order stochastic dominance order is closed under increasing transformation,
by the same reasoning, Pr[θi <∞ | ωi = B], is order-reversing.
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A.3.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Recall that p∗ is the optimal cutoff belief in the single-agent problem in which the payoff
from investing is L(ω).
First, I show that there exists a κ ∈ (0,−L(B)) such that whenever F (ω) = L(ω) + κ
for ω = G,B, φ(tκ) > p∗κ, where tκ is the upper endpoint of the support of the equilibrium
distribution and p∗κ is the optimal cutoff belief in the single-agent problem in which the
payoff from investing is L(ω) + κ.
By Proposition 1, the upper end of the support is increasing in κ. Further, the second-
mover cutoff is decreasing in κ and is equal to 0 for κ = −L(B). Because φ(0) > 0 and φ(t)
is strictly increasing in t, the first statement follows.
Second, keeping L(ω) fixed, the cutoff p∗ is increasing in both F (G) − L(G) and in
F (B) − L(B). Further, inspection of the proof of Proposition 1 reveals that G is strictly
decreasing pointwise both in F (G) − L(G) and in F (B) − L(B). (Specifically, the right-
hand side of (9) is increasing both in F (G)− L(G) and in F (B)− L(B).) It follows that if
F (ω) > L(ω) + κ for ω = G,B, φ(tκ) > p∗κ.
A.3.4 Proof of Proposition 4
When ρ = 1, pi(t) and φ(t) solve the (autonomous) system{
p′i(t) = λ pi(t)(1− pi(t))− (φ(t)− pi(t)) rL(pi(t))+λ(1−pi(t))L(B)φ(t)(F (G)−L(G))+(1−φ(t))(F (B)−L(B))
φ′(t) = 2λφ(t) (1− φ(t)) . (11)
Since φ(t) converges to 1 as t→∞, for any ε > 0 and t sufficiently large,
p′i(t) = λ pi(t)(1− pi(t))− (1− pi(t))
rL(pi(t)) + λ(1− pi(t))L(B)
F (G)− L(G) + o(ε). (12)
The right-hand side of (12) is positive if and only if pi(t) ≥ p, where
p :=
− L(B) (λ+ r)
(r + λ) (L(G)− L(B))− λF (G).
If p ∈ (0, 1], then p ≥ p∗. Also, (p, 1) is an asymptotically stable point of the differential
system (11). It follows that pi(t) converges and
lim
t→∞ pi(t) = p.
If p /∈ (0, 1), then pi(t) is increasing in t for any t ≥ 0 and
lim
t→∞ pi(t) = 1.
The statement of the proposition follows from the fact that p ∈ (0, 1) if and only if v > λ.
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A.4 Proofs for Section 5
The integro-differential equation that describes the equilibrium in Theorem 2 is((
Pr [ωi = G,ωj = G | τi ≥ t, τj ≥ t] r
+ Pr [ωi = B,ωj = G | τi ≥ t, τj ≥ t] (r + λ)
) ∆G
rL(G)
+
(
Pr [ωi = B,ωj = B | τi ≥ t, τj ≥ t] (r + 2λ)
+ Pr [ωi = G,ωj = B | τi ≥ t, τj ≥ t] (r + λ)
) (r + 2λ)∆B
rL(G)
+
φ(t)− p∗
1− p∗
)
eλt(1−G(t))
+
(
Pr[ωi = G,ωj = B | τi ≥ t, τj ≥ t] + Pr[ωi = B,ωj = B | τi ≥ t, τj ≥ t] p∗
1− p∗
)
·
(
1− e−λt† + λ
∫ t
t†
e−λs(1−G(s)) ds
)
= 0.
(13)
The proof of Theorem 2 parallels the one of Theorem 1 and is relegated to the Online
Appendix.
A.4.1 Discussion of the Parametric Assumptions
To understand the role of the assumptions, consider the hypothetical scenario in which
player j is allowed to invest only after player i, so that by construction I∗ = {i}.14 In
any equilibrium that survives the refinement, after player i has invested, player j behaves
according to the optimal single-agent policy described in Lemma 1: if player i invests at t,
player j either invests at t+ w(t), where
w(t) := min
{
w ≥ 0 : φ(t)
(1− φ(t)) e−λw + φ(t) ≥ p
∗
}
,
or abstain from investing if τj < t+w(t). Taking the behavior of the follower into account,
player i solves a single-agent optimal stopping problem: he chooses an investment time to
maximize
L(t) := e−rt
(
p0L(G) + (1− p0)e−λtL(B)
)
+ p0
(
p0 + (1− p0)ρ+ (1− p0)(1− ρ)e−λ(t+w(t))
)
e−r(t+w(t))∆G
+ (1− p0) e−λt
(
(1− p0 + p0ρ) e−λ(t+w(t)) + p0(1− ρ)
)
e−r(t+w(t))∆B,
where ∆ω = F (ω)− L(ω), for ω = G,B.
The expected payoff from investing (as a leader) at some time t depends on the expected
quality of both projects, on the probability that the opponent has observed a signal, and
14Again, I allow player j to invest with no delay after player i.
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on calendar time. As a result, the leader’s intertemporal considerations are not limited to
the standard trade-off between learning and discounting. The later the leader invests, the
more likely it is that an opponent with a bad project follows suit. However, the later the
leader invests, the shorter the time the follower waits before investing if he does follow suit.
As shown below, the assumptions (i) ρ > 0, (ii) p0/(1 − p0) < −F (B)/F (G), and (iii)
(r + λ)
(
L(B) + p0(1− ρ)
(
∆G + ∆B
))
+ 2(r+ 2λ)(1− p0 + p0ρ)∆B ≤ 0 guarantee that the
function L : R+ → R is single-peaked.
First, notice that w : R+ → R+ is continuous and non-increasing; it is of class C2 except
at tφ := min{t ≥ 0 : φ(t) ≥ p∗}. For any t > tφ, w(t) = 0. For any t < tφ
w′(t) = −1
− ρe
−λt
(p0(1− ρ) + e−λt (1− p0 + p0ρ)) (p0 + (1− p0)ρ+ e−λt(1− p0)(1− ρ)) , (14)
and
w′′(t) = −λ (1− ρ) ρe−λt
· (1− p0) (1− p0 + p0ρ) e
−2λt − p0 (p0 + (1− p0)ρ)
(p0(1− ρ) + e−λt (1− p0 + p0ρ))2 (p0 + (1− p0)ρ+ e−λt(1− p0)(1− ρ))2
.
Hence, w′(t) < −1 and w′′(t) < 0 if and only if ρ > 0. Let t∗ := min{t ≥ 0 : pi(t) ≥ p∗}.
Lemma 6. Under the assumptions (i)-(iii), the function L : R+ → R is single-peaked,
arg maxt L(t) =: t† ∈ (t∗, t∗), and L′(t†) = 0.
Proof. First, by assumptions (i) and (ii), 0 < tφ < t∗. Consider the derivative of L(t) with
respect to t, for t 6= tφ,
L′(t) = −e−rt
(
rp0L(G) + (r + λ)(1− p0)e−λtL(B)
)
− p0
(
r (p0 + (1− p0)ρ) + (r + λ)(1− p0)(1− ρ)e−λ(t+w(t))
)
e−r(t+w(t))(1 + w′(t))∆G
− (1− p0) e−λt
(
(r + λ) (1− p0 + p0ρ) e−λ(t+w(t)) + rp0(1− ρ)
)
e−r(t+w(t))(1 + w′(t))∆B
− (1− p0) e−λtλ
(
(1− p0 + p0ρ) e−λ(t+w(t)) + p0(1− ρ)
)
e−r(t+w(t))∆B.
If t < tφ, assumption (i) implies that 1 + w′(t) < 0. Further,
(r + λ)L(B) + λ
(
(1− p0 + p0ρ) e−λ(t+w(t)) + p0(1− ρ)
)
e−w(t)∆B < (r + λ)F (B) < 0.
So, L′(t) > 0 for any t < tφ < t∗.
At any t > tφ, w(t) = 0 and
L′′(t) = − rL′(t) + (1− p0)e−(r+λ)t(r + λ)
(
L(B) + p0(1− ρ)∆G + p0(1− ρ)∆B
)
+ 2λ(1− p0)e−(r+2λ)t(r + 2λ) (1− p0 + p0ρ) ∆B
<− rL′(t),
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where the last inequality follows from assumption (iii). Hence, if L′(t) = 0 for some t > tφ,
then L′′(t) < 0. Combining these observations, one gets that the function L(t) is single-
peaked and t† ∈ [tφ,∞). Last, it can be verified that L′(t∗) < 0 and that by assumption (ii)
L′(t∗) > 0, so that t† > t∗ and L′(t†) = 0.
A.4.2 Proof of Proposition 5
Lemma 7. Under the assumptions (i)-(iii), t† is increasing in ∆.
Proof. By Lemma 6, L′(t†) = 0. Now,
L′(t) =− e−rt
(
rp0F (G) + (r + λ)(1− p0)e−λt
)
+ p0(1− p0)(1− ρ)
(
r(1− e−λt)− λe−λt
)
∆
+ (1− p0)(1− p0 + p0ρ)e−λt
(
(r + λ)(1− e−λt)− λe−λt
)
∆,
where, by assumption (ii), the right-hand side is increasing in ∆ for any t > t∗. It follows
from the local concavity of L that t† is increasing in ∆.
Given ∆, let σ∆ be the equilibrium strategy and H∆ be the unique solution of the
integro-differential equation (OA.4) over [t†,∞) satisfying H∆(t†) = (1 − e−λt†)/λ, where
the dependence of t† on ∆ is omitted for notational convenience.15
Because t† is increasing in ∆, H∆(t) > H∆(t) for t ∈ (min suppσ∆,min suppσ∆). I
shall show that for ∆ > ∆, the functions H∆ and H∆ cannot cross on suppσ∆ ∩ suppσ∆.
Let t˜ := inf{t ≥ min suppσ∆ : H∆(t) ≥ H∆(t)}. Assume by contradiction that t˜ < ∞ and
t˜ ∈ suppσ∆ ∩ suppσ∆. In (OA.6), h(t) is increasing in ∆; hence, since h(t) > 1 in the
relevant range, H ′∆(t˜) > H ′∆(t˜), which contradicts the definition of t˜.
15Equations (OA.4) and (OA.6) are given in the online Appendix.
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